Historia cum Ioanna

I am watching this YouTube video: https://youtu.be/I2PWAQBcXGM?si=ZyxScNRVy9sY5f6L

Epistomology of disagreement: what you ought to do when you find out that you disagree with someone—what effect should that have on my belief

Depends on with whom and what the disagreement is about—who knows more, who has more authority here

Interesting case: equally knowledgeable about sth.: Epistemic peer

How is it possible that we all discuss thoroughly, lay out all the evidence, and agree the other is reasonable too—how is drawing different conclusions from same evidence possible?

If we share all the evidence and conclude that god doesn’t exist, it shouldn’t be reasonable to say that god does exist. If the evidence is just insufficient, we should suspend our judgement and say that we don’t know.

3 ways defending the possibility of reasonable disagreement, and how they don’t work

1. different background; think of evidence in different way; worldview differences
   1. Only if those world views themselves are not a part of the discussion, but we need to put those on the table too [however, feldman is assuming that the standards of evidence and justification themselves are not part of the worldview to be put on the table; the assumption that there is a neutral discussion]
2. Evidence is never fully shared, evidence that is incommunicable
   1. This doesn’t work. That’s also evidence we should discuss—if we take special personal religious experiences seriously, we should admit that god exist; if we don’t take them seriously, then theists are unreasonable
3. Maybe we acknowledge that the other side can make mistakes, blinded by circumstances
   1. That’s exactly a case where we don’t think the other is reasonable

So the conclusion is that there is no such thing as a reasonable disagreement.

But the second possibility is to suspend the judgement: we could both be neutral, weaken our own beliefs.